This research focuses on the organizational independence of the judiciary with an emphasis on administrative, employment, and structural matters in Iran and the United States. In Iran, the Constitution recognizes the independence of the judiciary, and according to Articles 157, 158, and 160, as well as some ordinary laws, broad powers have been granted to the head of the judiciary. However, an examination of the current situation reveals that in areas such as the employment of staff, organizational structure, and budget approval, this independence faces limitations for various reasons.
In the United States, the independence of the judiciary is guaranteed through the principle of separation of powers and a system of checks and balances, with the Supreme Court playing a key role in maintaining this independence. However, there are dependencies, such as the power of Congress to create and alter the structure of federal courts (except the Supreme Court) and approve the judiciary's budget. Additionally, the confirmation of Supreme Court and federal judges by the Senate and the president's power to pardon convicts are examples of infringements on the independence of the judiciary in the U.S.
A comparative analysis of the two legal systems shows that the judiciary in neither country enjoys absolute independence; however, much of this dependence can be justified by the reciprocal influence of the branches of government on each other. In practice, the financial dependence of the Iranian judiciary is more apparent, which impacts its true independence. While in the U.S., despite the extensive independence of the judiciary, the role of Congress in approving budgetary laws and confirming judges has created some dependency, no major issues have arisen in practice.