Guarantees play a crucial role in today's economic transactions. There is rarely a significant deal where one party does not request a guarantee from the other. These guarantees benefit the party that holds a superior economic position and sets the terms of the contract. The prevalence of such guarantees has prompted economic institutions to enter this field to gain profits. These guarantees are characterized by their independence from the underlying contract, thus diverging from traditional guarantee contract. However, in the realm of commerce, dependent and non-autonomous guarantees may also be issued. In this regard, the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) has established uniform regulations. The dependent nature of these guarantees aligns them more closely with guarantee contract in domestic law. Among all types of guarantee contracts, this type bears the closest resemblance to traditional and jurisprudential guarantees. Both lack the feature of independence and are based on the pre-existence of a debt. Nevertheless, there are significant differences between them. This descriptive-analytical study examines guarantees in international trade and Iranian law. The findings indicate that a conditional guarantee is a tripartite contract, whereas a traditional guarantee is concluded between the guarantor and the guarantee holder. Additionally, in conditional guarantees, the condition of suspension is accepted, whereas, in guarantees, suspension is explicitly invalidated by the legislator. The guarantee contract is an exemplary model of indulgence contracts, whereas conditional guarantees are entirely based on reciprocity.